The Primacy of the First Strike: An essay regarding the practice and execution of warfare in the 21st century and an analysis as to why it differs from all eras before it

During the Second World War Erich Hartmann shot down an unprecedented 352 Allied airplanes. His record has not been surpassed and likely never will be. After the war Erich Hartmann was frequently asked what the secret to his success was. He credited it to one attribute above all: his excellent eyesight. He firmly believed that in most of his aerial encounters he saw his enemy well before they saw him, which enabled him to position his fighter advantageously for the aerial duel to follow, or in many cases, shoot his enemy out of the sky before they even knew he was there.

Since the beginning of human conflict, the one who has been able to identify or strike their enemy or both before they are able to retaliate has always held a decisive advantage. One of the first revolutionary battlefield formations, the Greek phalanx, was in part so effective because of the long spears or pikes its constituents wielded. The long reach of these weapons guaranteed that the individual hoplites or phalangites within the formation would be able to engage their enemies wielding shorter spears or swords many feet before they had closed the distance. The Roman legion, while not presenting the same obvious visual cues as the phalanx’s wall of spears, had its own “first strike” method. Nearly every Roman legionnaire carried two javelins called “pila”. Prior to engaging in hand-to-hand combat, Roman legionnaires would unleash a volley of these missiles into the ranks of the enemy. The pila would kill a few, maim many and disrupt the entire formation, giving the legionnaires an edge before the deadly melee began. In the Middle Ages, English armies were successful time and time again when fighting larger French forces because of their native weapon of choice, the longbow. A skilled longbowman could fire his weapon at a faster rate and at much farther ranges than the average French archer could fire his crossbow, giving the English the ability to inflict casualties on French formations long before the French missile troops could do the same. Most memorably at the two great English victories of Crecy and Agincourt, concentrated English longbow fire decimated the ranks of mounted French chivalry before they could come to grips with their adversaries.

Throughout history, no matter the era, no matter the terrain, no matter the countries involved, and independent of every other factor, the military which possesses the ability to strike first, whether tactically or strategically, has always had a decisive advantage. It is my argument that in our current era of warfare in the 21st century that this ability now matters more than ever for two main reasons: the increasing cost of military tech and weapons systems and the overwhelming firepower available to modern militaries, which renders most defensive options unviable. Modern combat has increasingly become see first, shoot first, or like Erich Hartmann’s opponents, become a statistic.

In the 15th Century Italian military expert Marshal Gian-Giacopo Trivulzio advised King Louis XII that three things were necessary for the execution of war: money, money and yet more money. War has always been expensive. Yet with the rapid pace of technological advances in the 21st century all signs point to war being even more expensive in the future, not less. As weapons systems have become ever more digitalized and advanced targeting systems, displays and other technology has been implemented the costs of both producing these systems and training operators to use them effectively has risen exponentially. For example, during the last two years of WWII the P-51 Mustang manufactured by North American was the premier US fighter. In 1944 it cost the US government roughly $50,000 to build a Mustang. Adjusted for inflation this comes to about $900,000 dollars in today’s money. The US’s current premier fighter, the F-35, cost about $100 million dollars. Doing some simple arithmetic, we can see that today it costs a little over 111 times the amount of money to purchase a first-class fighter compared to what it did in WWII. But this isn’t the full picture. We must remember that the manufacturing capability and GDP of the US has also increased since 1944. We must take that into account as well, for it is even more important than a pure cost comparison to understand what fraction or percentage of the US’s total industrial capacity it took to produce these fighters then compared to now. If we take the cost of a P-51 Mustang in 1944 ($50,000) and divide this number by US GDP in 1944 (135 billion) we get 0.00000037 if we divide the cost of a modern F-35 ($100 million) and divide it by the current US GDP in 2024 (27.7 trillion) we get the number 0.0000036101. If we compare these two numbers (0.00000037 to 0.0000036101) we arrive at the conclusion that a modern F-35 costs nearly 13 times the percentage of current US GDP to produce than a Mustang did of US GDP in 1944. Another example we can point to is portable infantry anti-tank weapons. In 1944 the bazooka had just recently been introduced as the first mass issued personal infantry anti-tank weapon in US service. The US government bought them in 1944 for $19 a pop. The modern US infantry AT weapon, the Javelin, costs the US government $265,000 per unit. If we once again divide these costs by the respective GDP numbers, we get the values 0.000000000140740741 & 0.00000000888086643. Doing the math, we arrive at the conclusion that a modern anti-tank weapons system costs over 63 times the percentage of GDP to produce now than it did eighty some years ago. 

These comparisons highlight an increasingly important truth of modern conflict: the vast technological advancements and improvements being made to modern weaponry are outpacing the rate at which countries are improving their industrial ability to produce them. In short, modern economies are improving rapidly but the cost of military tech is increasing at an even greater rate. On the strategic level this means that at least in the near future conflicts will be decided by small amounts of highly advanced and costly weapons systems. Any amount that a nation can increase its production of these weapons systems will have a tremendous impact on the battlefield situation. Additionally, having standards to keep these weapon systems properly maintained in the field and the logistical chain to keep them supplied with ammunition, fuel and other needs will prove pivotal. Likewise making every effort to train and prepare crews of these systems as thoroughly as possible is essential to their effectiveness. Crews with battlefield experience should constantly be asked by those higher up in command how they and their systems could be better used, what weaknesses and faults they have found with their equipment and what they need to perform their tasks more proficiently. Highly experienced operators should also be rotated out of frontline fighting from time to time and perhaps even permanently to train new recruits and impart the invaluable knowledge they have learned while in combat. On the tactical level, commanders must use and position these valuable assets wisely to both most effectively utilize their firepower and to preserve both their operators and the weapons themselves whenever possible, carefully assessing the risks and rewards of using these systems based on the tactical situation they are in.

Modern military equipment is expensive to produce. Thus, militaries are faced with a daunting question: how do we preserve these weapon systems? Throughout the history of human warfare, a consistent answer to increasing levels of threat has been increasing levels of protection. In the Middle Ages as metallurgical advances increased the killing ability of metal tipped weapons, and new advancements like the crossbow put more penetrating power into the hands of combatants, so too did the quality and amount of armor combatants wore for protection. A cyclical pattern began in which new armor types would be developed to deal with new types of armament, reaction and counteraction. This pattern was suddenly and irrevocably broken by the advent of gunpowder. It didn’t change the situation overnight, but as gunpowder weapons became more effective and more widely available, personal armor became archaic. By the 1700 and 1800s European infantry and cavalry had scrapped all but the lightest pieces of armor in favor of greater mobility. There was no stopping the bullet or musket ball, all a soldier could do was to try his best to avoid it.